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Abstract: Joined-up government is often viewed as a remedy for coordination 
problems arising in the complex multi-organisational terrain of contemporary public 
services. Governments extol the virtues of formal coordination mechanisms as tools 
of joined-up government, both locally and centrally.  Such policy exhortations 
conceive of joined-up government from a rational-administrative perspective which 
implies that actors adopt coordination mechanisms as a functional response to 
systemic problems.  This paper explores the rationale behind the selection of 
coordination mechanisms from the perspective of policy actors at different levels of 
government, using evidence from a recent study of joined-up government in the field 
of homelessness.  It is argued that decisions about joining-up are the outcome of 
strategic and instrumental moves between actors, with each pursuing their own 
organisational interests and the outcome favouring the most powerful, motivations 
that are better encapsulated by a bureaucratic politics model.  Key aspects dominating 
collaborative decision-making include prioritisation of, and a desire to protect 
resources for, agencies’ and departments’ own client groups; the greater ability of the 
most powerful actors to gain the cooperation of other bodies in order to advance their 
own organisational agendas; and the adoption of coordination mechanisms to reduce 
risk and maintain organisational survival.   
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Introduction 
 
Advocates of joined-up government usually frame their arguments by appealing to the 
greater functionality and effectiveness of this approach to the running of government.  
A familiar argument is that working in a joined-up way should deliver more holistic 
responses to policy problems, particularly ‘whole-of-government’ problems that 
transcend departmental boundaries.  Joined-up government is also often construed as 
an administrative solution to the problem of departmentalism, providing incentives for 
departments to look beyond their own narrow departmental interests (Kavanagh and 
Richards, 2001). A further motivation for pursuing joined-up government is to reduce 
negative externalities or spillover effects which occur when one part of government 
fails to take account of the impact of its actions on other parts of government (James 
2003; Painter 2003).  At the citizen level joined-up government is said to lead to more 
seamless services. Lastly, it is argued to create efficiencies by reducing duplication 
across the departments and agencies of government. These technical and managerial 
justifications dominate the official rhetoric if joined-up government (Pollitt, 2003).   
 
Political scientists and public management scholars, however, have identified a range 
of underlying difficulties associated with joined-up working both at central and local 
government levels (Hudson, 1995; Peters 1998; Arblaster et al. 1998; Huxham 2000).  
They typically underline barriers such as differing cultures, priorities and 
organisational structures.  Others have examined the political rather than managerial 
motivations behind joined-up government reforms (Pollitt, ibid).  Such contributors 
do not necessarily take a fatalist view of the prospects for achieving joined-up 
government, but frame the issue differently to the more technocratic and managerial 
perspectives. 
 
The two approaches to the framing of joined-up government reflect two different 
strands of public administration theory, one of which can be termed a ‘rational-
administrative’ and the other a ‘bureaucratic politics’ perspective.  The former is the 
dominant framework within which policy prescriptions surrounding joined-up 
government are articulated, and has dominated the coordination and inter-
organisational relations literature.  The latter emphasises the competing interests and 
power dynamics at play in the context of joined-up government. 
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This paper empirically examines contrasting aspects of collaborative decision-making 
through the lens of these two rival theoretical perspectives.  It attempts to shed further 
light on the nature of collaborative decision-making in one area of public services 
where joined-up government has been attempted.  While joined-up government and 
inter-organisational collaboration more generally are well-researched subjects, the use 
of political science or public administration theory to frame such work has been less 
common.   
 
The paper contributes to a growing literature on vertical and horizontal coordination 
within the context of intra- and inter-governmental relations.  It focuses primarily on 
the use of coordination mechanisms such as joint coordinating units, joint protocols, 
joint bidding and co-location. Such mechanisms formalise joint working and can be 
considered the ‘scaffolding’ of joined-up government.  There is a substantial 
international literature on coordination and collaboration in government generally 
(Verhoest et al, 2007; Skelcher et al., 2005; Scharpf, 1994) as well as joined-up 
government (see Bogdanor et al., 2005 for an overview). However, there is relatively 
little work focusing on concrete mechanisms of coordination, particularly empirical 
work which examines their operational dynamics.  The paper therefore examines 
motivations for the adoption formal coordination mechanisms and the challenges of 
managing and sustaining these.  It uses qualitative evidence from a study of joined-up 
government in the field of homelessness, a subfield of British social policy which has 
formed one part of a broader joined-up government agenda.  Homelessness is a 
typical cross-cutting human services issue whose resolution is arguably best met 
through collaborative, multi-agency approaches.  The importance of collaboration in 
the context of human services has been recognised by a number of authors (Weiss, 
1981; Agranoff, 1991; Webb, 1991; Bardach, 1994; Hill and Lynn, 2003). 
 
  
Joined-up government as rational administration 
 
The rational administrative perspective is an ideal typical model of administrative 
decision-making.  Two well known variations of the model exist, notably synoptic 
and bounded rationality.  In the synoptic variant, decision-makers have a 
comprehensive overview of all possible policy alternatives and their consequences, 
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and pursue the course of action most likely to effectively and efficiently achieve their 
clearly defined ends (Lindblom 1965).  In the bounded variant, time constraints, the 
costs of considering different courses of action and limits to information processing 
capabilities, mean that decision-makers employ heuristics and pursue merely 
satisfactory or ‘satisficing’ solutions (Simon 1997).  While differing in the degree of 
information searching that is undertaken by bureaucratic decision-makers, these 
variants are united in their focus on means-ends decision making.  The rational 
administrative perspective implies that decisions are largely evidence-led rather than 
value-led, and fits within the Weberian ideal of the rational, mechanistic, value-free 
bureaucracy characterised by clear and uniform goals. Although the rational-
administrative perspective is rarely viewed as representative of the reality of modern 
bureaucracies, it serves as an influential ideal type.  The rationalist tradition has been 
described as the ‘mainstream’ approach to policy analysis (Elmore 1978) and has 
been extremely influential within attempts to improve the machinery of government 
in various countries (Ham and Hill 1993).   
 
Reform efforts aiming to improve coordination inside government largely sit within 
this conception of public administration, and the rhetoric of joined up government 
appeals to its logic.  According to Booth (1988), early models of public service 
collaboration introduced by government, such as joint commissioning in health and 
social care, were built upon two assumptions concerning inter-organisational 
behaviour. They were underpinned by the belief that organisations will collaborate for 
altruistic reasons in order to meet the needs of the service users or communities they 
serve, and when they are convinced that they can achieve more working together than 
working separately (Booth 1988, see Hudson 1995, p. 236).  Booth, however, 
expresses doubts about the validity of these assumptions, referring to such this 
conception of coordination as the ‘naïve position’. A similar perspective is taken by 
Hudson (1995) who finds the assumptions of the conventional ‘rational-altruistic’ 
model of coordination unrealistic. The model, he argues, assumes that agencies have 
common goals, a systemic overview of client needs and problems, consensus about 
their problems, and agreement on the best methods for tackling them, conditions 
which are in practice unlikely to occur.   
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A substantial inter-organisational relations literature follows the rationalist and 
technocratic vein and specifies coordination modes and mechanisms suitable in 
different task environments.  These contingency perspectives relate choice of 
coordination mechanism to contextual variables such as the level of task uncertainty, 
the degree of interdependence of the units involved and the size of the setting or 
number of units to be coordinated (Van De Venn et al. 1976; Alexander 1995).  They 
imply means-ends decision-making, with coordination mechanisms selected 
according to the nature of the problem or context.  Such applications have been made 
in the study of human services issues such as mental health (Alter and Hage 1993) 
and health and social care (Leutz 1999). 
 
Joined-up government as bureaucratic politics 
 
An alternative view is expressed by commentators who recognise the intensely 
political nature of coordination in inter-organisational settings.  Wamsely (1985), for 
instance,  argues that coordination requires negotiations in the context of competing 
interests and involves ‘major compromises, bargains and just plain deals’ (cited in 
Peters 1998: 300).  Similarly, Agranoff and McGuire (2004) recognise that 
collaboration, either between different arms or levels of government, occurs within a 
broader context of bargaining and negotiation. Others have emphasised the political 
nature of coordination in relation to central and local government (Stoker, 1991; 
Peters, 1998).  However, there is less consensus around which theories of political 
science best explain collaborative decision-making.   
 
Public choice theorists have long-observed ‘departmentalist’ behaviour amongst 
bureaucrats seeking to protect their own budgets, turf and personnel (Kavanagh and 
Richards, 2001).  Public choice theory itself sits within a broader bureaucratic politics 
paradigm.  An interesting focus of inquiry is the extent to which the bureaucratic 
politics paradigm continues to be applicable in the context of joined-up government 
efforts which are at least partially designed to overcome the problems that public 
choice theorists identify. 
 
The bureaucratic politics perspective on public administration views bureaucratic 
units as competing factions engaged in processes of bargaining, exchange and 
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compromise (Clifford 1990; Jordan 1994).  Bureaucratic decisions are essentially the 
product of strategic interactions between units pursuing their individual and/ or 
organisational interests.  Bureaucratic units use the resources at their disposal, such as 
information, finance, legitimacy or political capital, in order to secure these interests 
(Peters 1995).  Furthermore, the outcomes of negotiations typically favour the most 
powerful of the actors involved (Allison and Halperin 1972).  In the context of local 
government, these strategic interactions are often manifested in disputes over territory 
or ‘action space’, and protection of budgets, programmes and personnel (Stoker 
1991). Games metaphors and colloquialisms such as ‘empire building’ are often 
invoked to characterise such processes.   
 
The bureaucratic politics perspective is helpful in drawing attention to the power 
dynamics of interacting groups and the pursuit of individual rather than collective 
aims.  It is closely aligned with the rational choice paradigm (as distinct from rational 
administration described above) in its concern with the pursuit of organisational or 
individual interests.  However, it moves beyond rational choice theory by attempting 
to explain how actors seek to satisfy those interests through an explicit focus on the 
power dynamics of interacting groups.  It implies conflict rather than unity between 
the goals of central government departments.   
 
The differences between the two contrasting approaches are summed up in Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 Assumptions of the rival models: rational administration vs bureaucratic 
politics  
 
Model Nature of decision-
making 
 
Nature of human 
behaviour 
 
Nature of 
organisations’ 
aims 
Rational 
administration 
Means-ends search for  
efficient & effective 
solutions 
Altruistic Unified 
Bureaucratic 
politics 
Opportunistic/ 
Strategic  
Individually/ 
organisationally 
instrumental 
Conflictual 
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The research reported in the remainder of the paper explores the validity of each of 
these models in the context of collaborating decision-making. Evidence of a rational-
administrative approach would provide support for the following hypothesis:  
 
Rational administrative hypothesis: Collaborative decisions reflect means-
ends decision making where the most efficient and effective solutions are 
selected according to the particular problem at hand; altruistic concerns 
dominate decision-making; the aims of the departments or agencies involved 
are largely unified. 
 
By contrast, evidence to support a bureaucratic politics perspective would confirm 
this hypothesis: 
 
Bureaucratic politics hypothesis: Collaborative decisions are the outcome of 
strategic and instrumental moves between actors, each promoting their own 
interests; aims of different departments or agencies are not unified; the 
outcomes favour the most powerful local agencies. 
 
Before proceeding to the research findings, the context of joined-up government and 
coordination in the United Kingdom is briefly reviewed in order to illustrate the 
contemporary relevance of the topic.   
 
 
The context: coordination mechanisms and the joined-up policy agenda 
 
 
It is widely recognised that coordination in government has been a particularly high 
priority of British Labour Governments of the past 10 years, branded under the 
joined-up government label (6 et al., 2002; Ling, 2002; Hood 2005). Numerous 
initiatives and funding streams have been initiated to improve coordination in local 
public services and in central government (Sullivan and Skelcher 2002).   The concern 
to join-up public services and government has not abated in more recent times, with 
several formal coordination mechanisms introduced to assist with this.  
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Examples at local level include Local Area Agreements, strategic tools aiming to 
improve coordination vertically between central and local government and 
horizontally between local government and its partners.  Additional coordination 
mechanisms include legal duties to cooperate in fields such as homelessness, health 
and social services and criminal justice.  The community wellbeing power introduced 
under the Local Government Act 2000 facilitates cross-boundary partnership working 
between local authorities.  Measures to encourage joint commissioning of services 
have been introduced in relation to healthcare, through the recent Joint 
Commissioning Process for Health and Wellbeing.  Many cross-cutting areas of 
public service delivery are subject to compulsory multi-agency strategies which 
require the participation of local partner agencies.  Finally, local agencies delivering 
frontline services are increasingly on the receiving end of exhortations to collaborate 
and to formalise joint working arrangements using mechanisms such as joint 
assessment procedures, information sharing systems and joint protocols.   
 
The homelessness sector, the subject of this paper, has not been immune to these 
developments, and there have been significant attempts by the central state to 
encourage collaboration at local level (Moseley and James, 2008). Specific examples 
include funding streams to support multi-agency working in homelessness, official 
guidance relating to the use of coordination mechanisms, a legal duty to cooperate and 
a requirement to produce local multi-agency homelessness strategies. 
 
Within central government a host of coordination mechanisms have also been 
introduced. Cross-cutting targets and objectives have been set under the Public 
Services Agreement (PSA) regime (James 2003; 2004). Inter-ministerial and inter-
departmental working groups in fields such as children’s services and criminal justice 
have been established (Kavanagh and Richards 2001; Sullivan and Skelcher 2002).  
Central coordination units have been formed to provide strategic leadership and to 
generate advice on joint working (PIU 2000; Better Regulation Task Force 2002).  
Various coordinating networks have also been introduced in the Treasury and 
Cabinet, including the Permanent Secretaries Group, the Civil Service Management 
Board and the Principal Finance Officers networks.   
   
 9 
The above examples signify the UK Government’s commitment to, and faith in, 
coordination mechanisms, viewed as technical fixes for unlocking the practical 
barriers to cross-agency and cross-government working, and for producing holistic 
responses to cross-cutting problems.  After a brief outline of the methodology, the 
next sections of the paper assess the development and operation of these coordination 
mechanisms and the factors influencing collaborative decision-making more 
generally, exploring the relevance of the rival theoretical perspectives for explaining 
collaborative decision-making.   
 
Methodology 
 
Semi-structured interviews were conducted with civil servants working in government 
departments with responsibilities related to homelessness, and with ‘street level 
bureaucrats’ in three local authorities in England, including one unitary urban 
authority in the North West, one London Borough and one two tier urban authority in 
the South West. Authorities were selected to provide variation in terms of local 
authority structure, geography, and the presence or absence of government grants to 
support collaboration.  All areas had significant levels of homelessness and were 
engaged in coordination efforts.  In order to incorporate a diversity of views and 
settings, the local interviews were conducted with managers and practitioners in local 
housing authorities, as well other statutory bodies including health, social services and 
criminal justice agencies, and with voluntary sector agencies and housing 
associations. A total of 43 interviews were conducted and were tape recorded and 
transcribed.  The sampling frame is illustrated in table 2 below, with the number of  
interviews from each type of body in brackets.  
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Table 2 Sampling frame for interviews 
 
Local level 
Statutory Agencies Voluntary Sector Agencies Accommodation Providers 
Housing Authorities (7) 
Supporting People (3) 
Other LA  (1) 
Prisons (2) 
Probation Service (2) 
Police (2) 
Primary Care Trust (2) 
Health Outreach (2) 
Day Centres (2) 
Housing advice  projects (2) 
Night drop-in centre (1) 
Accommodation project (1) 
Meaningful occupation (2) 
Other homeless projects (2) 
Hostels (2) 
Housing Associations/ 
Registered Social Landlords 
(5) 
Central level 
Communities & Local Government (5) Department of Health (2) 
 
 
 
The interviews with civil servants were used to provide contextual information on the 
setting for local collaborative working but also to explore the dynamics of inter-
departmental coordination within central government, particularly themes related to 
the operation of central coordination mechanisms. The main aim of the local 
interviews was to explore actors’ motivations for developing formal coordination 
mechanisms, the challenges of this, and perceptions of their effectiveness, as well as 
general contextual issues affecting collaboration.  
 
The interview data were analysed using a thematic approach, involving the generation 
of themes from categories and codes (Smith, Harre, and Van Langenhare 1995).  
Transcripts were first scanned to gain an overall feel for the data. The text was 
organised into tables using the broad headings used in the interview schedules.  The 
data under these headings were then systematically coded using labels which 
summarised the meaning of the text.  Where these codes began to recur they were 
clustered into themes.  The themes reported below are presented in tabular form 
beginning with the most recurrent. 
 
Collaborative decision-making in central government 
 
Interviews with civil servants revealed a range of formal coordination mechanisms 
aiming to develop holistic approaches to homelessness in central government.  These 
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included inter-departmental groups, a housing network to make links between 
departments, and regular inter-departmental meetings between ministers.  In terms of 
the development of homelessness strategy, the National Homelessness Strategy and 
the Supporting People programme, the main fund for housing support, both had cross-
departmental steering groups attached to them.  A group had also recently been 
established to enable the Department for Communities and Local Government (CLG), 
the department with the main responsibility for homelessness, to develop a more 
strategic and systematic approach to its work with other departments and to identify 
shared priorities.  A joint work-plan had been established between the Department of 
Health and CLG to address the health component of homelessness.  
 
While these formal mechanisms suggest a structured and rational approach to joining 
up government, in practice these mechanisms were subject to a range of challenges.  
The most important issues related to competing priorities and the dominance of 
particular departmental agendas, a lack of willingness to shoulder responsibility for 
homelessness which lay outside of the core remit of most departments, resource 
limitations and a requirement to react to the political priorities of the day (see table 3).  
 
 
Table 3 Challenges of collaborating across government 
 
Challenge Example 
Competing departmental priorities; 
most powerful taking precedence 
Home Office reducing re-offending agenda 
trumping CLG homelessness priorities 
Unwilling to accept responsibility 
for policy issues outside of core 
remit  
Failure of other departments (eg Home Office, 
DWP) to accept shared responsibility for 
homelessness immigrants 
Resource limitations Competition for resources leading to protection 
of funds for own client groups  
Approach to cross-government 
working led by political priorities of 
the day 
Inter-departmental agendas reactive to press 
stories around prisoners, asylum seekers and 
migrant workers  
 
The competing priorities of different government departments, reflecting their 
individual targets, created difficulties for collaboration, and there were tensions 
around which departmental agendas should take priority. Even within departments, 
different directorates had their own priorities, with each viewing its own client group 
as most important.  These tensions were reflected within coordination mechanisms 
such as cross-departmental groups and inter-ministerial groups.  While cross-
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departmental groups facilitated a degree of collaborative working, interviewees 
suggested that the more powerful departments’ priorities dominated these forums.  
Inter-ministerial groups were considered one mechanism by which the more powerful 
departments’ interests were communicated to other departments.   
 
An example concerned the Home Office’s1 reducing re-offending agenda which was 
particularly dominant.  The Home Office was committed to prevent homelessness 
amongst ex-offenders in order to reduce re-offending. However, officials from other 
departments stated that their own priorities in terms of preventing homelessness lay 
elsewhere. For instance, CLG priorities centred on victims of domestic violence and 
refugees, groups which statistically accounted for a greater proportion of 
homelessness. While offenders represented less than 1% of statutory homelessness 
acceptances, pressure from the Home Office resulted in CLG’s work being diverted 
towards this client group.  Some interviewees considered there to be a lack of 
reciprocity, suggesting that while they assisted other departments such as the Home 
Office to meet their priorities, they received little assistance with their own agendas in 
return.  The inter-ministerial and inter-departmental groups were viewed as channels 
through which the more powerful departments could pressurise others into assisting 
with their agendas. 
 
A second issue related to departments’ unwillingness to accept a share of the 
responsibility for homelessness.  CLG officials believed that other government 
departments viewed homelessness as CLG’s problem.  Officials attributed to this 
partly to other departments’ failure to recognise that homelessness was about more 
than housing, despite a national homelessness strategy emphasising its cross-cutting 
nature.  An example involved homeless immigrants from the EU Accession States.  
CLG officials expressed frustration at other departments’ lack of cooperation over this 
issue.  This was a clear priority for CLG because large numbers of immigrants were 
finding themselves homeless in the UK, which in turn affected CLG’s ability to meet 
its rough sleeping targets. Since the issue also related to immigration, benefits and 
employment, CLG officials suggested that the departments representing these issues, 
namely as the Home Office and the Department for Work and Pensions, should share 
                                               
1
 During the period of the research re-offending lay within the domain of the Home Office, although 
this has since been transferred to the new Ministry of Justice. 
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responsibility for it. Yet there was little acknowledgement of this or support for 
CLG’s prioritisation of this matter.  Despite rhetoric around shared targets in central 
government, in practice departments’ own performance priorities took precedence and 
were a major obstacle to their ability to support the work of other departments.  
 
Resource pressures meant that officials had to make choices about which issues they 
could be involved in cross-departmentally, and had to manage other departments’ 
expectations in this regard.  These pressures generated competition between 
departments, which undermined coordinated working and led departments to protect 
and prioritise their own areas of responsibility.  As one civil servant commented:  
 
“I think resources are under increasing pressure and that creates tensions both 
centrally and locally…everyone is scrabbling around for their client groups”.  
(Interviewee 35) 
 
Finally, cross-government working was influenced by the political priorities of the 
day.  Civil servants noted that the inter-departmental linkages they held tended to shift 
according to Ministerial agendas, which were themselves affected by the mass media 
and public pressures.  Housing issues relating to prisoners, asylum seekers and 
immigration, for instance, were recurring themes in the media that came to dominate 
cross-departmental working.  This highlights the difficulty of undertaking planned, 
rational approach to collaborative working in a dynamic political environment.  
 
This brief depiction of the challenges of coordinating cross-departmentally illustrates 
ways in which the operation of formal coordination mechanisms was undermined by 
the broader context of bureaucratic politics.   Several features of inter-departmental 
relations were indicative of this, including departments’ pursuit of their own 
priorities, a lack of unity over priorities, conflicting rather than shared performance 
targets, and disagreements over where the responsibility lies for cross-cutting issues.  
Furthermore, power inequalities between departments resulted in certain coordination 
mechanisms serving the priorities of the most powerful departments, while 
competition for resources encouraged protection of budgets and client groups.  
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Collaborative decision-making at local level 
 
At local level, the most common coordination mechanisms employed included joint 
protocols, multi-agency assessment panels, multi-agency homelessness fora, service 
level agreements and joint training events.  Interviewees were asked to reflect both on 
their motivations for developing such formal coordination mechanisms and on the 
challenges of managing these.  They were also asked to reflect more generally on the 
general context for collaborating.   
 
Motivations for developing coordination mechanisms 
 
Coordination mechanisms were adopted when they provided tangible benefits to the 
agencies concerned. Instrumental motivations appeared at least as dominant, if not 
more so, than altruistic motivations associated with helping clients or functional 
concerns to reduce externalities.  In particular, mechanisms were viewed positively by 
interviewees when they had the potential to help agencies maintain organisational 
survival in a competitive financial environment, and to reduce risks in the blame 
culture in which they worked.  
     
Table 4 summarises the main motivations for developing formal coordination 
mechanisms.  In several cases agencies were considering co-locating services in order 
to reduce costs and pool resources.  Sharing administrators, premises and office 
infrastructure were strategic responses to limited financial resources. Voluntary sector 
organisations were particularly attuned to the financial benefits of co-locating, and 
were wary of the prospect of the local authority, their major funding body, cutting 
services because of perceived duplication in service provision by different agencies. 
Co-location therefore represented a survival strategy for some.  Similarly, joint case 
panels were viewed as a source of client referrals. Interviewees noted that their 
funding was dependent on maintaining a high throughput of clients. Increasing the 
volume of referrals was therefore seen as helping protect agencies’ financial viability.  
Financial considerations also motivated staff to consider developing consortia to bid 
for funds.  This was viewed as a means of reducing competition for limited funding 
within local areas. As one voluntary sector drugs project manager noted: 
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“money keeps coming down, it’s a ridiculous amount they want us to fight over, 
but we’re not doing that any more, so what we’ve decided to put together a 
consortium which will put in a bid for something like £300k”. (Interviewee 21)  
 
Linked to this, coordination mechanisms were developed opportunistically in 
response to funding streams. Numerous interviewees commented that government 
funding increasingly required agencies to demonstrate evidence of partnership 
working.  This had also encouraged them to engage in joint bidding and to develop 
consortia in order to obtain funding.  Examples included the incorporation of several 
agencies within a bid to develop a new homelessness hostel and a meaningful 
occupation project for homeless people.  
 
Formal coordination structures such as joint protocols were perceived as a means of 
protecting agencies against risk.  Such protocols clarified the responsibilities of 
different agencies, and could be used to safeguard agencies against charges of 
malpractice when serious incidents occurred in relation to individual clients.  As one 
Local Authority Resettlement Manager commented: 
 
“We’ve had to introduce a protocol around discharge arrangements from the 
hospital because there is a potential for things to go wrong & I think both 
sides want to firm things up in terms of risk.” (Interviewee 5) 
 
One local authority interviewee noted that they had managed to persuade their partner 
agencies to sign up to joint protocols by marketing them as risk management tools:  
 
“We’ve got a protocol with social services. It was hard to get agreement on 
some things, but you can if you demonstrate how it benefits them. The 
obvious hook for them is they will have a children act duty towards that 
family if we find them intentionally homeless.” (Interviewee 1) 
 
Similarly, risk management was an important motivation for employing information 
sharing protocols. These protocols typically incorporated client consent statements to 
enable information sharing about clients between specified agencies. Having such 
protocols in place offered agencies protection against possible breaches of data 
protection law.  Information sharing protocols were also viewed as a way of 
protecting staff from risky clients by ensuring that they had access to any information 
held by other agencies on dangerous behaviour.  
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Despite these instrumental and strategic motivations, there was also some evidence of 
altruistic and functional reasons for developing coordination mechanisms.  It was 
clear that local actors regarded certain coordination mechanisms as helping meet the 
multiple needs of clients.  Temporary, ad-hoc groups had been established in case 
study areas to respond to the needs of homeless people. They were functional in 
responding to service users’ needs, and the desire to tackle these was motivated by an 
altruistic concern to improve the lives of the individuals concerned.  Multi-agency 
teams and case panels had been set up in many cases because staff viewed them as 
necessary for tackling homelessness in a holistic way.  One homeless outreach 
manager commented: 
 
“We are a multi-agency team and were deliberately formed that way to respond 
to the needs of rough sleepers.” 
 
Coordination mechanisms were also employed in the belief that they would reduce 
externalities such as duplication and lack of coherence.  Agencies had attempted to 
‘iron out’ duplications and gaps in services, for instance, during regular multi-agency 
forum meetings. As a prison accommodation manager noted: 
 
“There are all sorts of duplications that multi-agency meetings help to iron out. 
And I think at the moment that is a particular focus.”  
 
While these altruistic and functional motivations were important, they appeared less 
influential as guiding reasons for adopting coordination mechanisms than strategic 
and instrumental motivations, as illustrated in table 4 which lists the themes in order 
beginning with the most salient. 
 
Table 4 Motivations for adopting coordination mechanisms at local level 
Motivation  Example 
Pooling resources in a difficult 
financial environment  
Co-location of agencies to reduce duplication 
& avoid risk of service cuts  
Levering in resources Joint case panels as a source of client referrals 
Rationalising available funding to 
reduce local competition 
Joint bidding and consortium building  
Protection against risk Development of joint protocols to prevent 
malpractice claims, data protection breaches 
and danger to staff  
Belief in their effectiveness for  
meeting client needs 
Joint case panels a mechanism for tackling 
needs holistically 
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Challenges of developing and managing coordination mechanisms 
 
Developing and managing coordination mechanisms at local level is a key part of 
fulfilling the aims joined-up government at the frontline of public services. Table 5 
outlines the core challenges of this in local areas.  The most common difficulty 
concerned disagreements over which agency should be driving the process forward.  
The costs and time associated with developing coordination mechanisms, combined 
with the risk of failure if these efforts did not produce tangible outcomes, meant that 
agencies were wary of taking a lead role.  This betrayed a lack of willingness to 
assume responsibility for homelessness on the part of some agencies.  Those agencies 
that did take the lead, for instance by offering to host and organise multi-agency 
events and meetings, resented the lack of reciprocity from other agencies which were 
perceived as free riders.    
 
The issue of priorities was raised by several interviewees.  The local authority’s 
priorities had militated against the development of coordination mechanisms and 
collaborative working in some cases. In one case the corporate prioritisation of local 
regeneration initiatives over affordable housing for low income groups conflicted with 
the homelessness remit of the housing needs section of the authority and had 
undermined collaboration between this department and the housing development 
section.   
 
Certain coordination tools were opposed where they were perceived as posing a threat 
to organisational autonomy or survival.  This applied to more ambitious forms of 
coordination such as mergers and integrated teams.  While the benefits of such 
methods were acknowledged, there was reluctance to embrace these. As one 
community worker commented: 
 
“There’s degrees of collaboration. At one end of the extreme we could just jump 
into bed with each other and become one organisation that does everything for 
everybody … but this is quite threatening for people.”     
 
Other coordination structures, particularly multi-agency fora, became arenas for 
disputes to surface and were regarded as adversarial and competitive. While they did 
serve a number of practically useful functions, they were also viewed as arenas where 
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culture clashes emerged, reflecting the disparate worldviews of the personnel 
attending, including voluntary sector and community workers, police, social workers, 
housing authority staff and health professionals. Agencies’ different priorities came to 
the fore in these meetings, which were a refection of different government targets and 
the priorities of different funding bodies.   
 
In several cases these fora were dominated by particular agencies that were perceived 
as wielding considerable influence over proceedings.  For instance, local authorities, 
as the strategic lead and body responsible for providing funding to many of the 
agencies around the table, were viewed as first among equals. Voluntary sector 
personnel commented that these forums often became public relations exercises with 
agencies using them to promote their activities and their performance to potential 
funding bodies around the table, rather than being used as an opportunity to tackle 
shared problems. In other cases there was resentment over the extent to which certain 
large voluntary sector agencies controlled the meeting agendas.   
 
Table 5 Challenges of developing and managing coordination mechanisms at 
local level 
 
Theme Example 
Failure to accept responsibility for 
leading on development of coordination 
mechanisms 
Agencies reluctant to lead on joint 
protocols without cooperation from other 
agencies 
Resentment created by free riding 
behaviour  
Costs of coordinating falling on proactive 
agencies 
Conflicting or differing local priorities; 
prioritisation of own information needs 
Council priorities lying elsewhere and 
thwarting attempts to develop joint 
systems; reluctance to establish joint 
processes which would not fulfil agencies 
own information needs 
Certain ambitious mechanisms viewed as 
threatening 
Co-location and multi-agency teams 
viewed as undermining autonomy 
Perceived dominance of certain agencies 
and competitive nature of inter-
organisational relations 
Multi-agency forums as ‘PR exercise’ for 
agencies seeking to project an image of 
success towards the local authority to 
protect funding; Larger agencies 
dominating agenda 
 
 
In summary, many of the challenges of developing and maintaining coordination 
mechanisms at local level, for instance the differing priorities of agencies, and 
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agencies’ reticence to shoulder the burden of leading on their development, are 
consistent with a bureaucratic politics perspective.  The motivations held by actors 
pursuing formal coordination tools suggest that they help agencies to secure their 
organisational interests, particularly in terms of their financial viability in a 
competitive environment.  Of course, it is plausible that the immediate concern to 
maintain organisational survival itself stems from a belief in the underlying 
importance of the work being carried out by the agencies concerned.  Indeed 
interviewees demonstrated a strong client-centred ethos.  Although less salient than 
instrumental and strategic considerations, functional and altruistic concerns did figure 
to some degree in collaborative decision-making.  Once coordination mechanisms 
were established they continued to be affected by tensions associated with 
bureaucratic politics, such as competition between agencies, differing priorities and 
the perceived dominance of powerful organisations. 
 
The general context for collaborating  
 
The operation of these mechanisms occurred within a broader context which in many 
ways impeded collaboration.  Four aspects which inhibited collaboration included a 
competitive funding system, scarcity of resources, the pressures of government 
bureaucracy including targets, and the parameters of government funding.  All this 
created a challenging backdrop within which local agencies were operating and meant 
that even where there was a desire to work collaboratively, this was often not 
possible.   
 
The competitive funding environment was a particularly strong theme. There was a 
perception that competition, especially in the voluntary sector, was undermining 
efforts to collaborate.  Interviewees characterised the voluntary sector as affected by 
‘in-fighting’, with agencies unwilling to openly share information with their 
competitors, or as one interviewee put it ‘playing their cards close to their chest’ 
(interviewee 12).  The competitive edge of the voluntary sector also resulted in a lack 
of willingness to share successful outcomes.  Changes to the way in which housing 
related support is funded through the Supporting People programme were underway 
during the period of the research, and there was evidence that the changes were 
further exacerbating the level of competition, especially amongst accommodation 
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providers. This fund was in the process of moving towards a tender-based system, and 
interviewees suggested this would result in greater tensions between agencies 
competing for this money. 
 
Also illustrating the competitive nature of the sector, there were perceived power 
inequalities between smaller voluntary sector agencies and larger agencies that were 
more successful in obtaining funding.  In some areas one or two very large 
homelessness organisations dominated the local arena and were regarded as being 
favoured by the local authority.  
 
The resource constraints within which agencies were operating also created tensions 
between agencies. For instance, many found it difficult to provide the level of service 
required within existing resources, causing frustration and resentment on the part of 
other agencies that were referring clients to these agencies.  Agencies referring to 
these services understood the resource constraints these services were under, but were 
nevertheless attempting to ‘battle’ with these agencies to obtain services for clients.  
 
General resource constraints were reflected in the language of interviewees who 
commented that local authorities operated in a ‘vice’, that the ‘screws’ had been put 
on local authorities and that the system was ‘on its knees’.  Some interviewees noted 
how the efficiency drive in the context of the Gershon Review meant that public 
organisations had to maintain and improve services with less funding.  Others 
commented that voluntary sector was ‘scrapping around’ for money, and that there 
were ‘diminishing pots of money’.  They described the unstable and short term nature 
of voluntary sector funding, which meant that some charities were ‘there today and 
gone tomorrow’.  These resource constraints meant that joint working was ‘the last 
thing people thought about’, according to one interviewee (interviewee 13). For 
organisations such as primary care trusts and social services departments operating 
under severe financial constraints, wider issues such as homelessness which were not 
their core priorities often suffered.   
 
Pressure to meet government targets and fulfil bureaucratic reporting requirements 
were additional background factors which preoccupied agencies.  While interviewees 
understood why monitoring and targets were important, these demands frustrated their 
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attempts to work laterally or flexibly across organisations.  Targets meant that 
statutory services devoted their time to fulfilling these at the expense of pursuing 
wider issues, often the cross-cutting issues which were relevant to several agencies 
but were of lower priority.  Similarly, bureaucracy and paperwork was frequently seen 
as leaving little time or opportunity to pursue the more creative cross-cutting work.  
The parameters of government funding and the rules of particular programmes 
regarding how money was spent also impeded the development of collaborative 
multi-agency approaches. 
 
Despite these wider policy and funding issues impeding collaboration, certain 
government agendas were recognised as having contributed to greater collaboration. 
One example concerned a resettlement policy introduced by the National Offender 
Management Service which had ‘forced’ the prison & probation services to ‘talk to 
other agencies’ (interviewee 1).  Another concerned the ‘Options Agenda’ introduced 
into housing and homelessness services, which one interviewee suggested was ‘what 
has brought us all together’ (interviewee 7).   
 
These issues relating to the broader policy environment serve to underscore the 
important role of central government in terms of creating a framework which enables 
local agencies to collaborate.  Such issues influenced the choices agencies made 
about collaborating and adopting coordination mechanisms.  
 
Discussion of the evidence in relation to the theoretical models 
 
Revisiting the rival theoretical perspectives and associated hypotheses presented at the 
outset of the paper, the evidence seems to be more closely aligned with bureaucratic 
politics than with rational administration.  First, coordination mechanisms are 
developed more for instrumental than for technical or altruistic reasons.  They are risk 
management tools, and are used to help maintain organisational survival.  On the 
other side of the coin, agencies sometimes choose to reject formal coordination 
mechanisms when they believe that they will undermine their autonomy.  Second, 
their development and management occur in the context of competing - and 
sometimes conflicting - rather than unified aims.  The aims of the various bodies are 
themselves heavily influenced by government targets and funders’ priorities.   
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Third, while means-ends decision-making does occur, the ends which are sought are 
not always associated with solving problems related to client needs. The ends pursued 
were often associated with organisational survival and protection of budgets, although 
this in itself may have stemmed from a desire to carry out work deemed to be 
important for solving homelessness.  Moreover, there was little evidence of a 
systematic and problem-solving approach to choosing specific coordination 
mechanisms; rather, they were adopted opportunistically in response to funding and 
reflected changing political priorities. Finally, the power of certain bodies meant that 
their agendas and interests took priority over others, something which created 
resentment and militated against collaboration. This was evident both at central and 
local level.    
 
Overall, collaborative decision-making is much more complex than the rational 
administrative model would suggest.  Contrary to the official rhetoric around joined-
up government and much of the inter-organisational theory literature, adopting 
coordination mechanisms is not simply a matter of matching problems and methods.  
This paper concurs with the view that coordination is a significantly political activity.  
A bureaucratic politics perspective provides a useful framework for delineating the 
political dynamics involved.  Formal mechanisms are the outcome of negotiations 
which reflect power differences between the units that are the focus of coordination. 
Moreover, they are most likely to be adopted where they serve the interests of the 
various parties involved.  Once established, there is no guarantee that they will serve 
the parties concerned in an even-handed way, and tensions are most apparent when 
there is an asymmetry of power.  Indeed, coordination mechanisms can be regarded as 
fora through which the tensions of inter-departmental and inter-governmental 
relations are played out.   
 
Conclusion and Implications 
 
Formal coordination mechanisms are a common feature of attempts to develop 
coherent approaches to complex policy problems. This paper provides evidence of 
concerted attempts by the British Government to achieve joined-up-government 
through initiatives to stimulate coordination at central and local levels.  The case 
study evidence suggests that those involved in delivering local public services 
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recognise the potential of such mechanisms and believe that they can help to alleviate 
externalities and lead to better services for clients. However, the differing priorities of 
the organisations and units concerned, and the struggle for survival in a competitive 
environment with limited resources, can detract from the realisation of these benefits.  
Establishing coordination mechanisms is not in itself a solution to cross-cutting public 
policy problems. Such mechanisms require continual management and nurturing.  
Future work focusing on how to manage such mechanisms in the context of 
bureaucratic politics would be promising avenue of enquiry. 
 
There is a paradox in that while the features of the inter-organisational environment 
described in the paper sometimes impede the development of coordination 
mechanisms, they can also serve to encourage this.  As the case study illustrates, 
instrumental motivations are a strong part of decisions to engage in formal 
coordination efforts.  Coordination mechanisms can help agencies to secure their 
organisational interests, and are more likely to be pursued when they are perceived as 
contributing to these.  Recognition of the mix of motivations affecting coordination 
decisions is likely to enhance the effectiveness of attempts to encourage the adoption 
of formal coordination mechanisms.  The coordination message is most likely to be 
bought at a local level when packaged as contributing to agencies’ own wellbeing, as 
well as to those of the communities they serve.  
 
A central issue raised at the outset of the paper was that formal coordination 
mechanisms and joined-up government generally are at least partly an attempt to 
solve the problems of departmentalism and silo-working.  The evidence from this 
study highlights the limitations of joined-up government in this respect. Collaboration 
does occur to some degree, but in the context of bureaucratic politics which reflects 
the continued departmental organisation of government. The departmental 
organisation of central government and the challenges this raises structures, and in 
many ways limits, the opportunities that local agencies have to work cohesively 
together.   
 
 24 
References 
 
Agranoff, R. 1991. "Human Services Integration: Past and Present Challenges in 
Public Administration." Public Administration Review 51(6): 533-542. 
Agranoff, R, and M McGuire. 2004. Another Look at Bargaining and Negotiating in 
Intergovernmental Management. Journal of Public Administration Research 
and Theory. 14(4): 495-512. 
Alexander, E. R. 1995. How Organizations Act Together: Interorganizational 
Coordination in Theory and Practice. Amsterdam, Gordon and Breach 
Publishers. 
Allison, G.T., and M.H. Halperin. 1972. Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some 
Policy Implications. World Politics 24:40-79. 
Alter, C. and J. Hage. 1993. Organizations Working Together. London, Sage. 
 
Arblaster, L., J. Conway, et al. 1998. Achieving the Impossible: Interagency 
collaboration to address the housing, health and social care needs of people 
able to live in ordinary housing. Bristol, Policy Press & the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation. 
 
Bardach, E. 1994. Can Network Theory illuminate Interagency Collaboration? 
Workshop on Network Analysis and Innovations in Public Programs, 
LaFollette Institute of Public Affairs, University of Wisconsin-Madison. 
 
Better Regulation Task Force. 2002. Local Delivery of Central Policy. London: 
Cabinet Office.  
Bogdanor, V. 2005. Introduction. In Joined-Up Government, edited by V. Bogdanor. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the British Academy. 
Clifford, J. G. 1990. "Bureaucratic Politics." The Journal of American History 77(1): 
161-168. 
Cresswell, J.W. 2007. Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing Among 
Five Approaches. London: Sage. 
Elmore, R. F. 1978. "Organizational Models of Social Program Implementation." 
Public Policy 26: 185-228. 
Ham, C. and M. Hill. 1993. The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. 
Hertfordshire, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
Hill, C. J. and L. E. J. Lynn. 2003. "Producing Human Services: Why Do Agencies 
Collaborate?" Public Management Review 5(1): 63-81. 
Hood, C. 2005 The Idea of Joined-Up Government: A Historical Perspective. In 
Joined-Up Government, edited by V. Bogdanor. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, for the British Academy. 
 25 
Hudson, B. 1995. Joint Commissioning: organisational revolution or misplaced 
enthusiasm? Policy and Politics 23 (3):233-249. 
Huxham, C. 2000. "The Challenge of Collaborative Governance." Public 
Management 2(3): 337-357. 
James, O. 2003. The Executive Agency Revolution in Whitehall. Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
James, O. 2004. The UK Core Executive's Use of Public Service Agreements as a 
Tool of Governance. Public Administration 82 (2):397-419. 
Jordan, G. 1994. The British Administrative State: Principles versus Practice. London 
and New York, Routledge. 
Kavanagh, D, and D Richards. 2001. Departmentalism and joined-up government. 
Parliamentary Affairs 54 (1):1-18. 
Klein, R., and W. Plowden. 2005. JASP Meets Jug: Lessons of the 1975 Joint 
Approach to Social Policy for Joined-Up Government. In Joined-Up 
Government, edited by V. Bogdanor. Oxford: Oxford University Press, for the 
British Academy. 
Leutz, W. N. 1999. "Five Laws for Integrating Medical and Social Services: Lessons 
from the United States and the United Kingdom." The Milbank Quarterly 
77(1): 77-110. 
Lindblom, C. E. 1965. The Intelligence of Democracy. New York, The Free Press. 
Ling, T. 2002. Delivering joined-up government in the UK: dimensions, issues and 
problems. Public Administration 80 (4):615-642. 
Moseley, A, and O James. 2008. Central State Steering of Local Collaboration: 
Assessing the Impact of Tools of Meta-Governance in Homelessness Services 
in England. Public Organization Review 8 (2):117-136. 
Painter, M.J. 2003. Intergovernmental Relations and Public Administration: 
Introduction. In Handbook of Public Administration, edited by B. G. Peters 
and J. Pierre. London: Sage. 
Performance and Innovation Unit (PIU). 2000. Wiring It Up: Whitehall’s 
Management of Cross-Cutting Policies and Services. London: HMSO. 
 
Peters, B.G. 1995. The Politics of Bureaucracy. White Plains, N.Y.: Longman 
Publishers USA. 
Peters, B. G. 1998. Managing Horizontal Government: The Politics of Co-Ordination. 
Public Administration 76 (2):295-311. 
Pollitt, C. 2003. "Joined-up Government: a Survey." Political Studies Review 1(1): 
34-49. 
 26 
Scharpf, F.W. 1994. Games Real Actors Play: Positive and Negative Coordination in 
Embedded Negotiations. Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (1):27-53. 
Simon, H. A. 1997. Models of Bounded Rationality: Empirically Grounded Economic 
Reason. Cambridge, MA and London, MIT Press. 
 
Skelcher, C, N Mathur, and M Smith. 2005. The Public Governance of Collaborative 
Spaces: Discourse, Design and Democracy. Public Administration 83 (3):573-
596. 
Smith, J.A., R. Harre, and L. Van Langenhare. 1995. Rethinking Methods In 
Psychology London: Sage. 
Stoker, G. 1991. The Politics of Local Government. London, Macmillan. 
Sullivan, H, and C Skelcher. 2002. Working Across Boundaries: Collaboration in 
Public Services. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Van De Ven, A. H., A. L. Delbecq, et al. 1976. "Determininants of Coordination 
Modes within Organizations." American Sociological Review 41(2): 322-338. 
 
Verhoest, K., G. Bouckaert, and B.G. Peters. 2007. Janus-faced reorganization: 
specialization and coordination in four OECD countries in the period 1980-
2005. International Review of Administrative Sciences 73 (3):325-348. 
Webb, A. 1991. Coordination: A Problem in Public Sector Management. Policy and 
Politics 19 (4):229-241. 
Weiss, J. A. 1981. "Substance vs. Symbol in Administrative Reform: The Case of 
Human Services Coordination." Policy Analysis 7(1): 21-45. 
6, P, D Leat, K Seltzer, and G Stoker. 2002. Towards Holistic Governance: The New 
Reform Agenda. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
                                               
i
 The research reported in the paper was funded through an ESRC doctoral research award (PTA-039-
2004-00006) and I am grateful for this support. I would also like to thank Professor Oliver James for 
guidance, and Dr Nicole Bolleyer and participants in the ESRC Seminar on Inter-Governmental 
Relations, University of Exeter (12/02/09), for comments on an earlier version of the paper.  
